





Precautionary Saving and Precautionary Wealth 
 













The Center for Financial Studies is a nonprofit research organization, supported by an 
association of more than 120 banks, insurance companies, industrial corporations and 
public institutions. Established in 1968 and closely affiliated with the University of 
Frankfurt, it provides a strong link between the financial community and academia. 
The CFS Working Paper Series presents the result of scientific research on selected 
topics in the field of money, banking and finance. The authors were either participants 
in the Center´s Research Fellow Program or members of one of the Center´s Research 
Projects. 
If you would like to know more about the Center for Financial Studies, please let us 
know of your interest. 
 
    
Prof. Dr. Jan Pieter Krahnen  Prof. Volker Wieland, Ph.D. 
  
CFS Working Paper No. 2006/02 
Precautionary Saving and Precautionary Wealth 
 
Christopher D. Carroll





January 20, 2006 
 




This is an entry for The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd Ed. 
 
 
JEL Classification: C61, D11, E21 
 
 
Keywords: Precautionary Saving, Prudence, Consumption Function, Buffer Stock Saving 
 
1  Department of Economics, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore MD, http://econ.jhu.edu/people/ccarroll, Corresponding author 
 
2  Department of Economics, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI, 48109, http://www.umich.edu/¡«mkimball Contents
1 Introduction 2
2 Strength of the Precautionary Saving Motive 2
3 Buﬀer Stock Wealth 5
3 . 1 C o n c a v i t yo ft h eC o n s u m p t i o nF u n c t i o n ............ 7
4 Empirical Evidence 8
4 . 1 E u l e rE q u a t i o nM e t h o d s..................... 8
4 . 2 S t r u c t u r a lE s t i m a t i o nU s i n gM i c r oD a t a ............ 9
4 . 3 S u r v e yE v i d e n c e .......................... 9
4 . 4 R e g r e s s i o nE v i d e n c e ....................... 1 0
5 Conclusion 111 Introduction
Precautionary saving is additional saving that results from the knowledge
that future income is risky.
In principle, additional saving can be achieved either by consuming less
or by working more; here, we follow most of the literature in neglecting the
“working more” channel by treating noncapital income as exogenous.
Before proceeding, a terminological clariﬁcation is in order. “Precaution-
ary saving” and “precautionary savings” are often (understandably) con-
fused. “Precautionary saving” is a response of current spending to future
risk, conditional on current circumstances. “Precautionary savings” is the
additional wealth owned at a point in time as the result of past precautionary
behavior. That is, precautionary savings at any date is the stock of extra
wealth that results from the past ﬂow of precautionary saving. To avoid
confusion, we advocate use of the phrase “precautionary wealth” in place of
“precautionary savings.”
2 Strength of the Precautionary Saving Mo-
tive
In the standard analysis, precautionary saving is modeled as the outcome
of a consumer’s optimizing choice of how to allocate existing resources be-
tween the present and the future. The standard analysis of precautionary
saving originates in a two-period model by Leland (1968), which was ex-
tended to the multiperiod case by Sibley (1975) and Miller (1976). Addi-
tional interest in precautionary saving was stimulated by the computer sim-
ulations of precautionary saving in Zeldes (1989) and the connection made
in Barsky, Robert B., N. Gregory Mankiw and Stephen P. Zeldes (1986) be-
tween precautionary saving and the eﬀects of government debt.
To clarify the theoretical issues, we break down the consumer’s problem
into two steps: The transition between periods, and the choice within the
period. A consumer who ends period t with assets at receives capital income
in period t +1o fatr. The consumer’s immediate cash resources in period
t + 1 consist of such capital income, plus the assets that generated it, plus
2labor income yt+1:
mt+1 = atr + at + yt+1 (1)
=( 1 + r)
  
≡R
at + yt+1. (2)
The simplest interpretation of m is as the contents of the consumer’s bank
account immediately after receipt of the paycheck and interest income. R
is the real interest factor, as distinct from the real interest rate, lower case
r. at reﬂects the consumer’s accumulated assets at the end of period t,a f t e r
the spending decision for period t has been made. The transition from the
beginning to the end of period t reﬂects the fact that spending is paid for by
drawing down m:
at = mt − ct. (3)
To decide how to behave optimally, the consumer must be able to assess
the value of arriving in period t+1 in any possible circumstance. This infor-
mation is captured by the value function vt+1(mt+1). Here, we simply assume
the existence of some well-behaved vt+1; below we show how to construct vt+1.
Standard practice assumes that consumers in period t weight future value
by the factor β;i fβ = 1 the consumer today cares equally about current
and future pleasure, while if β<1 the consumer prefers present to future
pleasure. Given β, and assuming that the consumer’s period-t beliefs about
future distribution of income are captured by the expectations operator Et,
we can deﬁne the value of ending period t with accumulated assets at as
ωt(at)=βEt[vt+1(Rat +˜ yt+1)], (4)
where the ∼ over the y indicates that period-(t+1) income is uncertain from
the perspective of period t.
The consumer’s goal is to optimally allocate beginning-of-period resources
between current consumption and end-of-period assets:
max
ct
{u(ct)+ωt(mt − ct)}. (5)
By deﬁnition the optimal choice will be a level of ct such that the consumer
does not wish to change behavior. Under standard assumptions this implies








since if this were not true the consumer would be able to improve his well-
being by changing ct.
Figure 1 depicts the consumer’s problem graphically. For given initial
mt, the consumer’s goal is to ﬁnd the value of a such that (6) holds. The
left hand side of (6) is the upward-sloping locus. As for the two downward-
sloping loci, the lower one reﬂects expected marginal value if the consumer
is perfectly certain to receive the mean level of income Et[˜ yt+1], while the
higher downward-sloping function corresponds to the case where income is
uncertain.
When the risk is added, the optimal choice for end-of-period assets moves
from a∗ to a∗∗.S i n c e ct = mt − at, the increase in a in response to risk
corresponds to a reduction in consumption. This reduction in consumption
is the precautionary saving induced by the risk.
For a given vt+1(mt+1), the exercise captured in the diagram can be con-
ducted for every possible value of mt, implicitly deﬁning a consumption func-
tion ct(mt).









t+1(mt+1) are good measures of how much
a risk of given size will shift the marginal value of assets curve ω 
t(a)t ot h e
right. For a constant relative risk aversion value function, relative prudence
is equal to relative risk aversion plus one. Kimball and Weil (2004) look at
the strength of the precautionary saving motive when Kreps-Porteus (1978)
preferences are used to break the usual equation ς =1 /ρ where ς is the
elasticity of intertemporal substitution and ρ is relative risk aversion. In
this more general case, the counterpart to relative prudence P is given by
P =( 1+ςε)ρ,w h e r eε is the elasticity with which absolute risk aversion
declines and absolute risk tolerance increases.
Note that, given the basic properties ς>0a n dρ>0, a positive wealth
elasticity of risk tolerance implies that P >ρ . This is a special case of a much
more general result ﬁrst hinted at by Dr` eze and Modigliani (1972). Even for
very exotic objective functions, the precautionary saving motive will always
be stronger than risk aversion whenever ownership of more at due to a small
4forced reduction in consumption would lead an optimizing investor to bear
more risk (a property that Dre´ ze and Modigliani (1972) call “endogenously
decreasing absolute risk aversion”). This general result holds because if own-
ership of extra at due to a small forced reduction in consumption would lead
an optimizing investor to bear risks she was previously indiﬀerent to, then
reduced consumption must be complementary with bearing near-indiﬀerent
risks. The symmetry of complementarity then implies that, given a free
choice of consumption levels, taking on an additional near-indiﬀerent risk
will lead an optimizing consumer to reduce consumption. For example, con-
sider an agent with additive habit formation (as distinct from multiplicative
habits, cf. Carroll (2000)), for whom reduced consumption not only increases
assets but reduces the size of the consumption habit, and so unambiguously
leads to more willingness to bear risks. Such an agent will want to reduce
consumption if induced to take on an additional risk by a compensation that
makes her indiﬀerent to the risk. The size of the compensation is determined
by risk aversion. Yet the compensation for the agent’s risk aversion is not
enough to cancel out the precautionary saving eﬀect of the risk.
3 Buﬀer Stock Wealth
The prior discussion suggested that precautionary behavior can be under-
stood by considering a tradeoﬀ between the present (captured by u(ct)) and
the future (captured by ωt(mt − ct)).
That analysis was incomplete in a crucial respect: It took the initial level
of resources, mt, as given exogenously. But arguably the most important
question about precautionary behavior is how large an eﬀect it has on the
prevailing level of m. This cannot be answered using a framework that treats
m as exogenous.
The framework can be extended to address this problem, by deﬁning the
problem in such a way that the functions v and ω reﬂect the discounted
value of an inﬁnite number of future periods. This is often accomplished by
making assumptions under which optimal behavior in every future period is
identical to optimal behavior in the current period; it is then possible to solve
for a “consumption function” that provides a complete characterization of
the relationship between resources and spending.
The critical extra assumption is “impatience,” broadly construed as a
condition on preferences that prevents wealth (or the wealth to income ratio)
5from growing to inﬁnity. In the simplest version of the model where income
does not grow, the required condition is Rβ < 1; for the appropriate condition
in models with income growth, see Carroll (2004).
The exact nature of income risk turns out to be less important than
the assumption of impatience. Here, we analyze a particularly simple case
(which is an adaptation of a model by Toch´ e (2005)). There are two kinds
of consumers: workers and retirees. Retirees have no labor income, and
must live oﬀ their assets. Workers earn a ﬁxed amount of labor income in
each period, but face a constant danger of being exogenously forced into
retirement. (Exogenous forced retirement is the sole source of risk in the
model).
Under these assumptions, if the utility function is of the standard constant
relative risk aversion form u(c)=c1−ρ/(1 − ρ), optimal behavior for retirees
is very simple: They spend a constant fraction of m in each period, where
the fraction depends on the degree of impatience.
The situation for workers is more interesting; it is depicted in ﬁgure 2.
The simplest element of the ﬁgure is the line labelled “Perm Inc.” This
shows, for any m, the level of spending that would leave expected m un-
changed; it is equal to labor income plus the interest on capital income,
and is upward sloping because a consumer with more m earns more capital
income.
The assumption of impatience is reﬂected in the fact that the consump-
tion function that would apply if uncertainty did not exist, ¯ c(m), is every-
where above the level of permanent income (income of the perfect-certainty
consumer is adjusted downward so that the reduction in unemployment risk
does not cause an increase in mean income). In other words, an impatient
consumer facing no uncertainty would choose to spend at a rate that cannot
be sustained indeﬁnitely.
The locus with arrows is the consumption function, which indicates the
optimal level of spending (in the presence of uncertainty) for any given level
of m. Since the diﬀerence between c(m)a n d¯ c(m) is purely the consequence
of risk, that diﬀerence ¯ c(m) −c(m)c o n s t i t u t e st h ea m o unt of precautionary
saving associated with any speciﬁc m.
Standard assumptions about preferences and uncertainty imply that there
will be an intersection between the permanent income locus and the con-
sumption function. (For a proof that there will be only one intersection,
see Carroll (2004)). The intersection deﬁnes a “target” level of m:T h el e v e l
such that an employed consumer with this amount of resources today will
6end up with the same m next period. Dynamics are captured by the arrows,
which indicate that, for initial values of m below the target, consumption is
below permanent income, so m is increasing and consumption crawls upward
along the consumption function toward the target. For initial values of m
above the target, consumption is above permanent income, so m is falling.
The existence of a target level of resources has many interesting implica-
tions. Perhaps the most surprising is that in equilibrium the expected growth
rate of consumption for employed consumers is unrelated to the interest rate
or the degree of impatience.
To understand this point better, and to relate it to the literature, we
restate the point in a slightly more general form: The equilibrium expected
growth rate of consumption for employed consumers is approximately equal
to their predictable rate of income growth,
Et[∆logC
e
t+1] ≈ g. (7)
In many respects the equilibrium equality of consumption growth and
the rate of permanent income growth seems intuitive. However, it appears
to conﬂict with a standard way of analyzing consumption growth, which
relies on the ﬁrst order condition from the optimization problem (the ‘Euler




−1(r − τ)+φ (8)
where ρ is the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion and τ is the geometric rate
at which future utility is discounted (related to the time preference factor
β); φ is a term that reﬂects the contribution of precautionary motives to
consumption growth.
The resolution of the apparent contradiction is that the precautionary
component of consumption growth is endogenous; combining (7) and (8)
permits us to solve for the equilibrium value of the precautionary contribution
to consumption growth:
φ ≈ g − ρ
−1(r − τ). (9)
We return to this point below.
3.1 Concavity of the Consumption Function
We can characterize the eﬀect of uncertainty by noting three facts about
ﬁgure 2: c(m) < ¯ c(m) (consumption is lower in the presence of uncertainty);
7limm→∞ ¯ c(m) − c(m) = 0 (as wealth approaches inﬁnity the eﬀect of uncer-
tainty in labor income vanishes); and c(m) is strictly concave, so that the
marginal propensity to consume out of a windfall increase in income, c (m),
is greater for poor people than for rich people.
The concavity of the consumption function bears further comment. In-
tuitively, it can be understood in a similar light to the eﬀect of liquidity
constraints. A consumer who is subject to a currently-binding liquidity con-
straint is someone for whom a marginal increase in cash will result in an
immediate one-for-one increase in spending (a marginal propensity to con-
sume (MPC) of one). However, if the same consumer happened to have a
large windfall transfer of cash (say, he wins the lottery), he would no longer
be currently constrained, and his MPC would (presumably) be less than one.
In the case of precautionary saving, the ownership of an extra unit of wealth
relaxes the suppression of consumption due to risk; this relaxation is more
powerful for low-wealth consumers living on the edge of (precautionary) fear
than for high wealth consumers with plenty of resources. Thus, either liquid-
ity constraints or precautionary motives or both will cause the consumption
function to become concave (Carroll and Kimball (2005)). Huggett (2004)
shows that consumption concavity in turn implies greater equilibrium wealth.
4 Empirical Evidence
4.1 Euler Equation Methods
The early literature relevant to identifying the strength of precautionary mo-
tives tended to rely on Euler equation estimation (see Browning and Lusardi
(1996) for a survey), often by estimating regression equations of the form
∆logCt+1 = α0 + α1Et[rt+1] (10)
and interpreting the coeﬃcient on the interest rate term as an estimate of
the inverse of the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion (which holds true under
time-separable CRRA utility, cf. (8)). However, this analysis did not take
into account the dependence of higher order terms like φ on the independent
variables (see (9)). Some papers like Dynan (1993) attempted to account for
precautionary contributions to consumption growth; but see Carroll (2001)
for a critique of the whole Euler equation literature (including the second-
order approach).
84.2 Structural Estimation Using Micro Data
A new methodology for estimating the importance of precautionary motives
was pioneered by Gourinchas and Parker (2002) and Cagetti (2003) (with a
related earlier contribution by Palumbo (1999)). Their idea was to calibrate
an explicit life cycle optimization problem using empirical data on the magni-
tude of household-level income shocks, and to search econometrically for the
values of parameters such as the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion that max-
imized the model’s ability to ﬁt some measured feature of the empirical data.
Gourinchas and Parker (2002) matched the proﬁle of mean consumption over
the lifetime; Cagetti (2003) matched the proﬁle of median wealth. The in-
tensity of the precautionary motive emerges, in each case, as an estimate of
the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion, which Gourinchas and Parker (2002)
put at about 1.4 and Cagetti (2003) ﬁnds to be somewhat larger. (A value
of 1 corresponds to logarithmic utility). One important caution about these
quantitative results is that the method’s estimates of relative risk aversion
depend on the model’s assumption about the degree of risk households face.
Recent work by Low, Meghir, and Pistaferri (2005) suggests that the esti-
mates of the magnitude of permanent shocks in Carroll and Samwick (1997)
used for calibration by Gourinchas and Parker (2002) and Cagetti (2003)
may be overstated by as much as 50 percent. Reestimation of the structural
parameters using the Low et. al. calibration would generate larger estimates
of relative risk aversion.
4.3 Survey Evidence
The principle that whenever risk-bearing increases with at, the precaution-
ary saving motive (prudence) must be stronger than risk aversion provides
an important theoretical lower bound on the degree of prudence. One read-
ing on the size of risk aversion is provided by survey responses to hypo-
thetical gambles over lifetime income in the Health and Retirement Study.
Kimball, Sahm, and Shapiro (2005) estimate that relative risk aversion has
a median of 6.3 and a mean of 8.2. (Note that because of Jensen’s inequal-
ity, the mean of relative risk aversion Eρ is larger than the reciprocal of
the mean of relative risk tolerance 1
E(1/ρ).) These estimates of relative risk
aversion imply precautionary saving motives much stronger than those that
have been used empirically to match observed wealth holdings or insurance
choices. This discrepancy remains unresolved.
94.4 Regression Evidence
A separate literature attempts direct empirical measurement of the rela-
tionship between uncertainty and wealth. To ﬁx notation, index individual
households by i and assume uncertainty for household i in period t can be
measured by some variable σt,i. Then in its simplest form the idea is to
perform a regression along the lines of
logmt,i = σt,iγ + Zt,iα +  t,i (11)
where Z is some set of variables that capture life cycle, time series, and other
nonprecautionary eﬀects. In principle, one can then calculate the predicted
magnitude of m if everyone’s uncertainty were set to zero (or some alternative
like the minimum measured value of σ in the population).
In principle this method permits the data to speak in a much less ﬁl-
tered way than the structural estimation approach. A drawback is that even
if the magnitude of precautionary wealth could be estimated reliably and
precisely, it would not be clear how to translate those estimates into a mea-
sure of relative risk aversion or some other set of behavioral parameters that
could be used for analyzing policy questions such as the optimal design of
unemployment insurance or taxation.
A further disadvantage is that the method does not reliably yield the same
answer in diﬀerent data. Using a measure of subjective earnings uncertainty
from a survey of Italian households, Guiso, Jappelli, and Terlizzese (1992)
estimate the precautionary component of wealth at only a few percent, while
Kazarosian (1997) and Carroll and Samwick (1998) estimate the precaution-
ary component of wealth for typical U.S. households to be in the range of 20-
50 percent. Hurst, Lusardi, Kennickell, and Torralba (2005) argue that esti-
mates of α are inordinately sensitive to whether business owners are included
in the dataset; and work by Lusardi (1998, 1997) and Engen and Gruber
(2001) implies much smaller precautionary wealth. Such large variation in
empirical estimates is not plausibly attributable to actual behavioral diﬀer-
ences across the various sample populations.
A problem that plagues all these eﬀorts is identifying exogenous variations
in uncertainty across households. The standard method has been to use
patterns of variation across age, occupation, education, industry, and other
characteristics. This runs the danger that people who are more risk tolerant
may both choose to work in a risky industry and choose not to save much,
biasing downward the estimate of the eﬀect of an exogenous change in risk.
10One recent paper attempts to get around this problem by using a nat-
ural experiment: Fuchs-Schundeln and Schundeln (2005) show that before
the collapse of the Berlin Wall, East German civil servants had similar in-
come uncertainty to that faced by other East Germans. However, after the
collapse of Communism, income uncertainty went up dramatically for most
East Germans - but not for civil servants, who were given essentially the
same risk-free jobs in the new merged government that they had had before
the collapse. Fuchs-Schundeln and Schundeln (2005) show that, in accord
with a model that includes substantial precautionary eﬀects, saving rates of
most East Germans increased sharply after uniﬁcation, but saving rates of
civil servants did not. By contrast, the West Germans–who would have been
subject to more selection into jobs based on risk preferences–exhibited little
diﬀerence in saving rates between civil servants and others with riskier jobs,
either before or after reuniﬁcation.
5C o n c l u s i o n
The qualitative and quantitative aspects of the theory of precautionary be-
havior are now well established. Less agreement exists about the strength of
the precautionary saving motive and the magnitude of precautionary wealth.
Structural models that match broad features of consumption and saving be-
havior tend to produce estimates of the degree of prudence that are less than
those obtained from theoretical models in combination with risk aversion
estimates from survey evidence. Direct estimates of precautionary wealth
seem to be sensitive to the exact empirical procedures used, and are subject
to problems of unobserved heterogeneity that have been demonstrated from
German data after reuniﬁcation. Thus, establishing the intensity of the pre-
cautionary saving motive and the magnitude of precautionary wealth remain
lively areas of debate.
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